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When a stimulus is repeated the memory representation for that stimulus is strengthened and 
performance in memory tests increases. To what extent this effect requires that each exposure 
elicits a fully-fledged conscious percept? In two Rapid Serial Visual Presentation (RSVP) 
experiments we explored whether the memory representations for words would accumulate 
evidence trough repeated exposure when none of those presentations induced a conscious 
percept. Participants were instructed to identify repeated items inserted in different RSVP 
streams and we isolated the first instance that an item was consciously perceived as repeating. 
The results showed that the probability of detecting a repetition for the first time was constant 
across repetitions. This effect signals a limit to the evidence accumulation process through 
repeated exposure. We discuss whether conscious perception modulates the decay of memory 
representations with below-threshold items resulting in extremely fleeting memory 














It is uncontroversial to believe that memories for a stimulus are strengthened through 
repeated experience of that stimulus. Indeed, Endress and Potter (2014) have explicitly shown 
this to be the case, even for briefly fixated objects. However, a key question is the role of 
conscious perception in this process. In this respect, the scenario presented in Case 1 in figure 
1 is not controversial; that is, if a stimulus is consciously perceived, some sort of “trace” 
(whether activation-based or synaptic) of that stimulus would typically form after the moment 
of awareness. Furthermore, such a trace could accumulate over repeated presentations, i.e. 
there would be evidence accumulation. 
 
Figure 1: three theories of how the brain responds to repeated presentations. The stimulus 
sequence is shown in black as three presentations of the same stimulus. The awareness transient 
reflects the conscious experience of the presented stimulus. Three accumulation regimes are 
shown. CASE 1: evidence accumulates across presentations, each of which yields an, if only 
brief, conscious percept. CASE 2: evidence accumulates without conscious percepts. CASE 3: 
evidence dissipates between presentations, none of which generate a conscious percept. 
What happens though, in the case of stimuli that do not reach awareness is less clear. 
That is, would it be possible for the trace of an item to strengthen, i.e. for evidence to 
accumulate, through repeated presentation if none of those presentations induced a conscious 
percept, such that conscious perception becomes more likely with further presentations, as in 
Case 2 of Figure 1? In contrast, it could be the case, as shown in Case 3, that stimuli that do 
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not reach a threshold of awareness do not leave a trace that accumulates over multiple 
exposures.  
This is the question we consider in this paper, viz, we seek to determine whether the 
brain behaves as Case 2 or Case 3 of figure 1. In other words, do representation traces for 
stimuli registered below the the awareness threshold, dissipate back to baseline so quickly that 
there is effectively no evidence accumulation for the preconscious percept? (How these 
different modes of evidence accumulation relate to relevant phenomena in the literature, such 
as subliminal priming, is considered in the Discussion section.) 
 
To answer this question, one needs a means to present a lot of stimuli in such a way 
that many do not cross the awareness threshold. The natural way to do this is with Rapid Serial 
Visual Presentation (RSVP), for which it is known that only a small subset of the presented 
stimuli are reportable, or indeed recognisable (Bowman et al., 2013; Bowman, Filetti, 
Alsufyani, Janssen, & Su, 2014; Potter, 1976). 
 
In fact, there are previous studies that have considered the progressive strengthening of 
memories with RSVP (Albrecht & Vorberg, 2010; Endress & Potter, 2014; Subramaniam, 
Biederman, & Madigan, 2000). For example, Endress and Potter (2014) reported that images 
(and words) presented more often across a number of Rapid Serial Visual Presentation (RSVP) 
streams were recognized more accurately in a final recognition test. Given that, as previously 
discussed, in RSVP studies, participants often show very poor recognition performance, 
Endress and Potter’s findings are open to the interpretation that some items leave memory 
traces that gain strength through repetition, despite not being consciously perceived. That is, 
although we will ultimately argue against this position, Endress & Potter’s findings open the 
possibility that Case 2 of figure 1 obtains and memories accumulate through repetition for the 
pre-conscious percept.  
 
However, some studies have reported that most stimuli presented in RSVP do not 
display consolidation/evidence accumulation through repeated exposure.  Subramanian, 
Biederman and Madigan (2000) presented participants with RSVP streams of drawings of 
objects. Participants were instructed to search for a target image. Crucially, some of the non-
target pictures were presented 15 times on average before becoming a target. The results 
revealed an absence of a repetition effect; that is, participants were not better at detecting the 
targets that had previously been repeated relative to those presented once. In a similar vein, 
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Bowman et al., (2014) presented participants RSVP streams of first names and they were 
instructed to search for a Fake Name (a name they were pretending was their name). In 
addition, in Experiment 3, they were instructed to search for frequently presented names; that 
is, they had to search for names simply on the basis that they were repeated. Importantly, these 
repeating names were presented as often as the Fakes (up to 50 times). The behavioral results 
(recall and recognition test at the end of the experiment) indicated that participants found it 
very hard to identify the repeated names; and consistent with this, in ERP findings, the Fake 
generated a clear P3 that was absent for the repeating name.  As in Subramanian et al. (2000), 
participants were actively searching for an additional item (Target in Subramanian et al, Fake 
in Bowman et al), which arguably could hinder the encoding process of repeating items.  
 
Taken together, the above described findings are far from offering a coherent picture. 
On the one hand, some studies raise the possibility that evidence accumulation is possible for 
non-retrievable (and thus not consciously perceived) stimuli presented in RSVP1. This would 
suggest that items naturally elicit (graded-strength) memory traces. On the other hand, other 
studies suggest that the capacity to form memory traces from the fleeting representations of 
items in RSVP is very limited. That is, despite the serial presentation of items in RSVP, unless 
an item is processed to the point that it reaches a state of awareness, evidence for it would not 
accumulate.  
 
One can view the present study as shedding light on the nature of the discrepancies 
between the described findings. If the presentation of stimuli in RSVP results in memory 
representations of gradual strength, these representations may increase in strength with every 
repetition, facilitating retrieval. On the other hand, the encoding of items could follow a 
bottleneck behavior: a small number of stimuli would (enter consciousness and) be stored in 
stable WM representations, while the vast majority would not reach that stage. Importantly, the 
“missed” stimuli would not benefit from successive repetitions, since residual information 
would not survive the presentation of new items.  
 
                                                     
1 Our focus in this paper is specifically on access awareness (Baars, 2002; Block, 2007) 
which means that conscious perception can be associated with retrievability; that is, report is 
taken as an indicator of awareness. 
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In the previous studies that have considered the progressive strengthening of memories 
with RSVP (Subramanian, Biederman & Madigan, 2000; Endress & Potter, 2014), a repeating 
stimulus occurred incidentally in RSVP streams through the course of an experiment. Then a 
recognition test on the stimulus was inserted after a certain number of repetitions. This previous 
work, though, was not specifically focussed on preconscious evidence accumulation, which is 
our interest. That is, they did not probe memory in such a way that they could identify the first 
time a stimulus was seen as repeating, leaving the possibility that their recognition reports could 
have arisen after at least some previous presentations were consciously perceived, i.e. Case 1 
in our figure 1.  As a result, we have had to employ a somewhat different experimental 
paradigm to these previous studies. In particular, we could not rely on recognition memory 
tests at the end of each of a number of RSVP streams, since such a test could reveal the identity 
of a repeating (target) stimulus whether it had or had not been perceived in a stream to that 
point, thereby consciously priming its future perception. This would confound any test of an 
intrinsic below threshold build-up of evidence with repeated presentation. 
 
We are interested in isolating the first instance at which a (non-primed) repeating item 
is consciously perceived as repeating. To obtain such a test, we have run an RSVP repetition 
experiment, where we instruct participants that a repeating item will be presented, but we do 
not identify it and participants are required to search for it simply on the basis that it repeats. 
 
With this approach, we can test what turns out to be the key property for us, which is 
that (first) detection of repetition is invariant to the number of prior presentations, with the 
following procedure. 
 
1) We determine the first instance at which an item is seen as repeating. 
 
2) We assess whether the probability of this first instance is invariant to the number of 
prior repetitions; by determining the conditional probability of seeing a repetition, given that it 
has not been seen as a repetition before. 
 
If this conditional probability, which we call the first seen as rep. probability, is indeed 
invariant across repetitions, there is no evidence accumulation before a repetition is first seen. 
This can be illustrated with reference to figure 1, where the accumulation inherent to Case 2 
would ensure that the probability of first seeing (and then seeing as a repetition) would increase 
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with each sub-threshold registration of a stimulus. This is because the distance to threshold 
would be reducing on each registration. In contrast, in Case 3, the probability of first seeing 
(and then seeing as a repetition) would not change with (below threshold) registration of a 
repeating stimulus. This interpretation of Cases 1 and 2 is confirmed in simulations in the 
appendix. 
 
More specifically, we have designed two different tasks using RSVP of streams of 
words: (1) a Repetition task and (2) a Detection task.  In the first of these, the repetition task, 
participants were instructed to search for a word that was repeated across trials/ streams. They 
were informed that they were going to see several streams of words and they must search for 
the repeated word. At the end of each trial/ stream, they had to answer the question “Which 
one was the repeated word?”. We varied the presentation time in two experiments (from an 
SOA of 17ms to 533ms).  In this task, we tested to what extent participants can detect repeated 
items inserted in different RSVP trials. This enabled us to examine to what extent contents 
generated in RSVP can accumulate evidence through repetitions, with a key test being 
invariance to prior presentation of the first seen as rep. probability. To do this, we examined 
whether the number of presentations of a word increased the probability of first detecting the 
repeated word. 
 
While, as we have discussed, the experimental paradigm we employ here is somewhat 
different to that used in (Subramanian, Biederman & Madigan, 2000; Endress & Potter, 2014), 
we believe our experiment and theirs are comparable. In particular, our experiment can be seen 
as a generous test of the evidence accumulation question, since we are instructing participants 
to look for repetitions. That is, if evidence does not accumulate preconsciously for repeating 
items, when participants are explicitly instructed to look for such items, it seems unlikely that 
is would incidentally, when participants are not instructed to look for them. Incidental build up 
is the approach in the Subramanian, et al and Endress & Potter experiments. 
 
The results of the Repetition Task were compared with those of a Detection task, which 
effectively served as a baseline to compare against. In the Detection task, participants were 
instructed to search for pre-specified target words. This enabled us to explore to what extent 
participants can search for stimuli in RSVP on the basis of their perceptual properties. With 
the comparison of the two tasks, we aimed to illustrate the time-course of two fundamentally 
different types of search: one based on the perceptual features of task relevant items (Detection) 
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and the other based purely on frequent occurrence (Repetition). Our findings will confirm that, 
consistent with previous work (Bowman et al, 2013; Potter, 1976;), the brain is exceptionally 
good at searching for pre-specified items, as per our detection task. In contrast, searching on 




2.1 Experiment 1 
 
2.1.1 Participants 
21 undergraduate students of the University of Birmingham took part in Experiment 1 
in exchange for course credits. All were right handed, native English speakers and had normal 
or corrected-to-normal vision. The experiment conformed to British Psychological Society 
criteria for the ethical conduct of research and ethical procedures of the School of Psychology 
at the University of Birmingham. 
 
2.1.2 Materials 
36 English nouns were selected from the English Lexicon Project database (Balota et 
al., 2007) to serve as Targets. Additionally, 1800 English words were selected as Distractors 
from (Warriner, Kuperman, & Brysbaert, 2013). Two lists of Targets were created so that 
participants could perform the Detection and Repetition task on a different set of Targets. Both 
lists of Targets were controlled for word frequency, concreteness and emotional valence. All 
targets and distractor words had 6 letters and none of them were proper nouns. The same set of 
Distractors was used in both lists.  
 
2.1.3 Procedure 
RSVP streams were presented on a 24’’ LCD screen (refresh rate: 60Hz, resolution: 
1600 x 1200) using custom PsychToolbox scripts running under Matlab 2016a. Stimuli were 
16-point white (75% white) characters on a dark background (25% white). Participants were 
seated at 60cm from the screen.  
 
The experiment was conducted individually in a quiet room. Each experimental session 
was divided into two tasks (Detection Task and Repetition Task). The order of tasks was 
counterbalanced (15 participants performed the Detection Task first and 16 participants 
9 
 
performed the Repetition Task first). Each task consisted of 18 blocks (3 blocks per SOA 
condition: 33, 133, 233, 333, 433 and 533ms) presented in random order. The target was the 
same within a block and different across blocks.  
 
Detection Task 
Each block consisted of 10 trials. At the beginning of the block, participants saw the 
instruction “Search for the word:” in the upper part of the screen along with the target word 
presented at the centre of the screen for 2 seconds. Each trial started with the centred 
presentation of the fixation cross (+) for 500ms. Then a stream of 10 words was presented and 
a final item “######” at the end of the stream. The trial ended with the question “Have you 
seen the target word?”. Participants responded to the question by pressing predetermined “yes” 
and “no” buttons. The target word was presented in 5 of the 10 trials of each block and the 
remaining 5 trials were target absent trials. The target word could be presented in any position 
of the stream except position 1st, 2nd, 9th and 10th. The duration of this session was 
approximately 25 minutes. 
 
Repetition Task 
Each of the 18 blocks of the Repetition Task consisted of 11 trials. The trials started 
with the instruction “Search for the repeated word”. Then participants were presented with 11 
trials with a similar structure as those of the Detection task. However, in this task, participants 
were instructed that one of the words presented during the first trial would be presented several 
times in the following trials. This first trial of the block was not followed by a question2, while 
the remaining 10 trials were followed by the question “Have you seen the repeated word?”. 
Participants typed the word that they considered was repeated or pressed “Enter” to continue 
with the next trial. As in the Detection task, the repeated item (RI) was presented in 5 of the 10 
experimental trials, so that half of the experimental trials in a block did not contain the RI.  
Importantly, distractors did not repeat within a block. The administration of this task lasted 
approximately 28 minutes.  
 
 
2.2 Experiment 2 
                                                     
2 Note that in Bowman et al., (2014) participants were not instructed of the presence of the repeated name at a 
specific trial, making the task harder.  This may explain why the repeating stimulus was detected less easily in 




The materials and procedure were the same as for Experiment 1. The only difference 




24 undergraduate students from the University of Birmingham participated in 
Experiment 2 in exchange for course credits. None of these students had participated in 
Experiment 1. The same exclusion criteria were used in both experiments. The experiments 
performed conformed to British Psychological Society criteria for the ethical conduct of 
research and ethical procedures of the School of Psychology at the University of Birmingham. 
 
3. Results 
3.1 Repetition and Detection Task 
Although the main piece of evidence we are seeking to identify is the estimation of the 
(accumulation) repetition effect in RSVP (which is described in the next section), the results 
described here –comparing the d’ score of the Detection and Repetition task– give a global 
picture of the time-course of participants’ performance in both task. 
Experiment 1 
We calculated participants’ d’ measures for both tasks. In the Detection task, the Hits, 
Misses, False Alarms and Correct Rejections were obtained from the “yes” and “no” responses. 
In the case of the Repetition Task, we considered as Hits all target-present trials where 
participants typed any word, even if it was not the Target. Similarly, we considered as False 
Alarms all trials where participants typed a word at the end of the trial but the repeated word 
was not presented. It is important to notice that the same criterion was used for the classification 
of responses as Hits or False Alarms3. Therefore, participants’ d’ measures above zero will 
correspond to their ability to distinguish trials where the repeated word was present from trials 
without the repeated word.  
                                                     
3 The consequence of this is that any “incorrect-identity” repetition-seen response that could be made is truly an 
error response and is thus equally likely to arise in a target-present as a target-absent trial and is as likely to 
increase False Alarms as Hits. This will then just show up as a change in response-bias, but will not impact d-
prime, which is how it should work in signal-detection theory. Figure E.1 in Appendix E shows performance in 
the repetition task using an alternative criterion: any string with a Levenshtein distance (the minimum number of 
single-character edits; insertions, deletions or substitutions) of 2 or less was accepted as a correct response.  
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A 2 (Task: Detection and Repetition) x 6 (SOA: 33, 133, 233, 333, 433, 533) within 
subjects ANOVA revealed that the d’ values (see Figure 2 and Table 1) were significantly 
larger for the Detection Task (mean=2.87 and sd=1.52) than for the Repetition task (mean= 
1.51 and sd=1.46), F(1,20)=171.7, MSE =115.78, p<0.001. There was also a main effect of 
SOA, F(5,100)=91.93, MSE =32.85, p<0.001. Unsurprisingly, d’ values were larger for the 
long SOA conditions, see Table 1. The interaction was also significant F(5,100)=7.75, MSE 
=1.97, p<0.001, showing the task effect was not constant across the SOA conditions. To 
analyse the interaction, we subtracted the d’ values of both task and performed post-hoc 
comparisons across the SOA levels. Pairwise comparisons revealed that the task effect was 
larger at 133ms relative to 33, 333, 433, and 533ms (all ps<0.05, Holm corrected). Similarly, 





A 2 (Task: Detection and Repetition) x 6 (SOA: 17, 50, 84, 117, 250, 400) within 
subjects ANOVA showed a main effect of Task, F(1,23)=247.2, MSE=97.09, p<0.001 
(Detection task: mean= 2.40, sd=1.9; Repetition task: mean=1.24, sd=1.58). The main effect 
of SOA was also significant, F(5, 115)= 164.4, MSE=61.56, p<0.001. Finally, the interaction 
Task x SOA was significant F(5, 115)= 15.17, MSE=4.92, p<0.001 (see Figure 2 and Table 2).  
Pairwise comparisons of the task effect (d’ Detection task – d’ Repetition task) across 
SOA conditions revealed that the task effect was significantly larger (all ps<0.05, Holm 
corrected) at 117ms relative to all other SOA conditions (17, 50, 250 and 400ms) except the 
84ms condition (p=0.67, Holm corrected). In contrast, the task effect at 17ms was significantly 
smaller (all ps<0.05, Holm corrected) compared with any other SOA condition (50, 84, 117, 








Figure 2. Results for experiments 1 (left) and 2 (right). The graph shows the d’ scores 
for the Detection and Repetition tasks across the SOA conditions. Error bars indicate standard 




Table 1. Mean d’ values and (standard deviations). Experiment 1 
TASK   SOA    
 33 133 233 333 433 533 
DETECTION 0.79 (0.57) 3.27 (0.51) 3.28 (0.62) 3.19 (0.60) 3.30 (0.58) 3.36 (0.56) 
REPETITION 0.04 (0.44) 1.24 (0.76) 1.65 (1.02) 1.91 (0.71) 2.11 (0.97) 2.11 (0.91) 
 
 
The effect of repetition in RSVP 
 
In this section, we assess the repetition effect on the probability of identifying a 
repeated item (RI) for the first time in the Repetition task.  Specifically, we tested whether the 
probability of identifying the RI increased as a function of how many times the RI had been 
presented. In the Repetition Task, participants were presented the RI five times (1st, 2nd, 3rd, 
4th and 5th repetition) per block.  This allowed us to calculate the probability of identifying 
Table 2. Mean d’ values and (standard deviations). Experiment 2 
TASK   SOA    
 17 50 84 117 250 400 
DETECTION 0.25 (0.51) 1.29 (0.59) 2.52 (0.77) 3.27 (0.60) 3.59 (0.31) 3.48 (0.5) 
REPETITION 0.12 (0.30) 0.39 (0.57) 0.94 (0.75) 1.25 (1) 2.38 (0.98) 2.36 (0.74) 
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the target at each repetition for the first time. Note that, contrary to the procedure adopted by 
the analysis described above (where any string of letters typed by participants was included in 
the calculation of Hits and False Alarms) for the present analysis, we only considered responses 
as correct if the RI was typed. To do that, the number of words correctly identified for the first 
time at repetition j (1 to 5) was divided by the number of blocks where the RI was missed at 
every repetition before j. That is, at repetition 1, the number of RIs identified (as repeating) at 
that repetition was divided by the total number of blocks (3) at each SOA condition. For 
repetition 2, the number of RIs identified (as repeating) for the first time at repetition 2 was 
divided by the total number of blocks where the RI was missed at repetition 1, and so on. See 
Appendix 1 for a formal definition of this measure. 
To calculate this probability at every repetition it is essential that participants missed 
some repetitions, since the first-seen measure depends on the number of repetitions where the 
target was not detected. From the results of the repetition task (see Figure 2, it is evident that 
participants were very good at detecting repetitions at long SOAs (>200ms). They had 
identified correctly on average more than 50% of the words by the third repetition. 
Consequently, we considered that the data available at these long SOA conditions did not give 
enough power to provide a good estimation of the effect of repetition. The opposite pattern was 
found at the shortest SOAs (33ms, Experiment 1; 17ms, Experiment 2) where participants were 
effectively at floor.  Therefore, the data submitted to statistical analysis were those 
corresponding to the SOA conditions: 133ms in Exp. 1, and 50, 84 and 117 in Exp.2). For 
completeness of reporting, Appendix C, Tables 5 and 6 summarise the full set of results. 
  
Experiment 1 
The data (see Table 3) were analysed using a probit mixed-effect model, with the lme4 
package in R (Bates, Mächler, Bolker, & Walker, 2015). Repetition (1st to 5th) was included as 
a fixed factor. The random structure of the model only included the intercept of the Participant 
factor. More complex models (including those with slopes in the random factor) did not reach 
convergence.  A Chi-square test from the probit linear mixed model results showed a non-
significant effect of repetition (p > 0.9). 
The non-significant effect of the repetition indicates that we cannot reject the Null 
Hypothesis that there is no effect of Repetition. To assess the extent in which our data are more 
consistent with the Null Hypothesis, we calculated the Bayes Factor from the Bayesian 
Information Criterion (BIC; Raftery, 1995) of two models following the approximation 
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suggested by Wagenmakers (2007)4: the full model (Repetition + random intercept per 
participant) and the restricted model (Intercept + random intercept per participant). The 
Repetition factor was included as a linear regressor (1 to 5) to model the “build-up” mechanism 
proposed by Endress and Potter (2014). The BF01 (null/alternative) was 6.90. Following the 
classification scheme of Raftery (1995) we concluded that this is positive evidence (BF 3-20) 
for the Null Hypothesis of no Repetition effect.  
 
Experiment 2 
We analyzed the data from Experiment 2 using the same methodology as in Experiment1. The 
data of the probability of first identification as a repetition (see Figure 3 and Table 4) were 
analyzed with a probit linear mixed model with SOA (50, 84, 117) and Repetition (1st to 5th) 
as fixed factors. The random structure of the model included the intercept per participant. The 
Chi-square test from the model revealed a significant effect of SOA, χ2(3) = 7.46, p = 0.024, 
and no significant effect of Repetition nor the interaction SOA x Repetition (both ps>0.8).  
The Bayes Factor between the BIC of the full model (SOA, Repetition and SOA x 
Repetition) and the restricted model (SOA) showed that the restricted model was favored by a 
factor of 9.077142e+13. Finally, the BF for each SOA condition between the full model 
(Repetition + random intercept of the participants) and the Null (intercept only + random 
intercept of the participants) revealed the following results:  BF01 SOA 50ms = 8.09, BF01 SOA 
84ms = 10.18, BF01 SOA 117ms = 9.99. As from experiment 1, the Bayes Factor analysis 
indicates that the results from experiment 2 favored the Null Hypothesis of an absence of a 
Repetition effect. 
                                                     





Figure 3. Results for experiments 1 (left) and 2 (right). The graph shows the probability 
of first detecting the target (as repeating) after every repetition. Error bars indicate standard 




















Table Table 3. Mean probability of first detection as a rep. and (standard deviations). Experiment 1 
 Repetition 
SOA 1 2 3 4 5 
133 0.13(0.2) 0.22(0.29) 0.23(0.35) 0.16(0.3) 0.18(0.36) 
Table Table 4. Mean probability of first detection as a rep. and (standard deviations). Experiment 2 
 Repetition 
SOA 1 2 3 4 5 
50 0.07(0.14) 0.07(0.17) 0.03(0.1) 0.03(0.12) 0.04(0.11) 
84 0.08(0.15) 0.1(0.17) 0.1(0.24) 0.09(0.18) 0.06(0.16) 
117 0.21(0.22) 0.16(0.27) 0.27(0.38) 0.19(0.38) 0.14(0.29) 
      











 In two studies, participants were presented streams of words at different presentation 
rates, while performing a detection or a repetition task. The repetition task required participants 
to search for repeated words across several streams (different trials). The detection task 
instructed participants to search for pre-specified target words within each trial. Participants 
were able to complete both tasks, with performance being considerably better in the easier 
detection task.. More importantly, in the repetition task the probability of detecting a repetition 
for the first time did not increase with the number of repetitions. This suggests that the 
performance in the repetition task was not aided by evidence accumulation across repeated 
instances of the same word.  This result has implications for our understanding of how fleeting 
representations are processed and remembered. At SOAs in the range of 84-133 ms, 
participants exhibit excellent performance on the detection task, with d’ scores well above 2.0. 
Thus, it must be the case that most of the words are individually being processed to some 
degree, and yet at these same rates, repetition detection does not benefit from evidence 
accumulation.  
 
In previous studies, the absence of accumulation effects had been obtained in conditions 
where performance in memory tasks was extremely poor. Subramanian et al., (2000) showed 
that non-targets repeated up to 15 times were not detected better once they became targets in a 
detection task. Importantly, they reported that, in similar conditions, recognition for non-targets 
in a forced-choice task was at chance. In Bowman et al., (2014), participants found it very hard 
to detect repeated names —presented up to 50 times— even when they were instructed to 
search for them. These findings pointed to a failure of memory encoding for items in RSVP. It 
seems that items neither accumulated evidence nor were easily retrieved, since there was little 
evidence for memory representations that could carry out those functions. The present results 
agree with those of (Bowman et al., 2014) and Subramanian et al., (2000) in that no repetition 
accumulation effect was observed. However, contrary to these studies, participants’ 
performance in the repetition task was not at chance. That is, even though participants’ capacity 




In contrast with the present results, in other studies, repetition demonstrably improved 
recognition performance, even in RSVP experiments. For example, Endress and Potter (2014) 
found that items presented more often in RSVP trials were recognized more accurately. They 
suggested that the repeated instances of items in RSVP build-up and result in stable long term 
memory representation. Our results could be signalling one fundamental limit of this 
mechanism. While it might be true that repetition facilitates retrieval, it could be that the 
retrievability (\ conscious perception) of items is a necessary condition for any repetition 
accumulation effect, as per case 1 of figure 1. Alternatively, it would have been possible that 
memory representations could accumulate evidence through repeated exposure prior to being 
strong enough to be consciously perceived and explicitly retrieved, i.e. case 2 of figure 1. Our 
findings contradict this notion, at least in experimental paradigms such as RSVP.  Our results 
showed no repetition accumulation effect prior to the explicit recognition of words (as 
repeating) for the first time, i.e. case 3 of figure 1. This opens the possibility that in RSVP, the 
evidence accumulation process is restricted to those items that have been consciously perceived 
and thus encoded in strong memory representations, at least sufficiently strong to support 
explicit recognition. In fact, the findings in Endress and Potter (2014) are consistent with this 
possibility. Since the benefit of repetitions was only apparent in a final recognition test (by 
comparing accuracy for items presented less and more often), it could be that only those items 
consciously detected were those that improved with repetitions after that point.  
 
Alternatively, the absence of a repetition effect could be attributed to memory capacity 
limits. Some stimuli would not be encoded in memory since memory limits are reached –given 
that streams consisted of 10 words (above short-term memory span). However, the d´ results 
of the Repetition Task contradict this interpretation. As can be observed in Figure 2, 
performance steadily improves up to asymptotic levels at slow presentation rates (SOA 
>200ms).  If performance in the Repetition Task were to be explained only by memory capacity 
limits, no effect of presentation rate would be expected. Instead, SOA strongly modulated the 
results, suggesting that the presentation conditions (duration on screen and masking by 
subsequent items) played a crucial role. Taken together, the results of the Repetition Task seem 
to indicate that, in respect to memory encoding, items in RSVP could result in two qualitatively 
different types of representations. Some items could be encoded in sufficiently strong memory 
representations that successful explicit memory recognition is possible. On the other hand, 
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most items may only elicit extremely fleeting “percepts” that would not survive the 
presentation of new items.  
 
The present results do not contradict the notion that the presentation of items in RSVP 
can facilitate/prime the processing of subsequent stimuli, which can be considered an 
alternative form of evidence accumulation. Priming effects are very unlikely to be observed in 
a paradigm such as the Repetition Task. The distance between RIs –both in terms of number 
of intervening stimuli and duration– is relatively long and priming effects tend to be inversely 
related to the gap between items of interest (Ferrand, 1996). Alternatively, priming might have 
an effect in a recognition task (and the Repetition Task can be conceived as a continuous 
recognition task) by increasing the familiarity of repeated items. However, it is unlikely that 
our Repetition Task could be performed on the basis of familiarity decisions given that the 
format of the task, where an explicit report of the identity of the RI is required, makes the task 
similar to paradigms (such as recall), which rely on recollection processes – and not familiarity.   
Are unidentified instances of RIs below threshold? The definitive answer to this 
question might ultimately require a resolution of the ongoing debate about the existence of 
phenomenological consciousness (Block, 2007; Cohen & Dennett, 2011). Indeed, we cannot 
rule out the possibility of phenomenological awareness of items presented in RSVP, i.e. that 
they are perceived, but forgotten before the end of the stream, see Figure 4. However, the most 
commonly accepted view in the RSVP literature is that the report of items at the end of the 
stream is taken as the behavioural correlate of conscious perception (for example: failure to 
report items in the attentional blink window) (Bergström & Eriksson, 2014). In the present 
experiment, the missed repetitions of RIs could similarly be interpreted as instances of below 
threshold stimuli.  
 
Figure 4. Further possibility for how the brain responds to repeated presentations. The 
stimulus sequence is shown in black as three presentations of the same stimulus. The awareness 
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transient reflects the conscious experience of the presented stimulus. Evidence dissipates 
between presentations, all of which generate a conscious percept. 
This said, even if one accepts the contribution of phenomenological awareness to 
perception in RSVP, i.e. that items in this presentation format could be consciously perceived, 
but then rapidly forgotten, our line of reasoning is not in fact contradicted. That is, we have 
demonstrated a failure of evidence accumulation of repeated presentations, and if some of these 
“prior” presentations elicited above threshold experiences that were then forgotten, that would 
just represent evidence for the even stronger claim, that it is also possible that evidence does 
not accumulate for items that are consciously perceived. Importantly, though, it would seem 
highly unlikely that every prior presentation of the RI is consciously perceived and then 
forgotten. Our key findings are based upon streams with SOAs between 50 and 133ms; it seems 
inconceivable that every item in a 10 item stream at such SOAs would be consciously 
perceived. Accordingly, even if some RIs are consciously perceived and then forgotten, there 
remain some that would not, whose existence is sufficient to carry our claim. 
The absence of apparent evidence accumulation (for stimuli in RSVP) could be the 
consequence of encoding processing limits of a similar nature to those responsible for other 
empirical findings such as the Attentional Blink (Raymond, Shapiro, & Arnell, 1992) and 
Repetition Blindness (Kanwisher, 1991). 2-stage theories of temporal attention (Bowman & 
Wyble, 2007; Chun & Potter, 1995) propose a first stage of large capacity where the attributes 
of items are extracted and a second stage where items are consolidated in WM. The memory 
encoding of items in our experiments seems to follow a 2-stage behaviour, where only a few 
items would break through to a second stage of consolidation into a durable representation 
(Wyble, Bowman, & Nieuwenstein, 2009). Indeed, the encoding of stimuli may depend on 
(what could be considered) random factors associated with presentation and processing (e.g. 
how effective the masking induced by the following item). This 2-stage interpretation gains 
further support if we compare the results of our repetition task with those of the detection task. 
Participants are much better at detecting pre-specified task-relevant items at any SOA condition 
than searching for repetitions. As can be observed in figure 2, at presentation rates close to 
10/s, participants are almost at ceiling at discriminating target-present from target-absent 
streams. This is consistent with (Potter, 1976), and what was called (Sub)liminal Salience 
Search in (Bowman et al., 2013). It also fits with the idea of featural and semantic information 
being extracted in a first large-capacity stage; and a natural prediction then is that most items 
could be detected on the basis of their task relevant properties, which is in agreement with the 
results of the Detection Task.  
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The findings also fit with a stronger claim, viz, that a key aspect of conscious perception 
is supporting episodic encoding of items, a position that Kanwisher has also argued for 
(Kanwisher, 2001). One interpretation of the repetition task is that it is episodic in nature: to 
know that a previous instance has occurred, an individuated representation of that earlier 
occurrence needs to be represented in memory. This is exactly the role of tokens in the 
Simultaneous Type/ Serial Token model (Bowman & Wyble, 2007): when bound, they indicate 
the occurrence of a type. This system detects a repetition when the same type is bound to two 
tokens. Thus, tokens provide durable representations of event occurrences. If the preconscious 
percept does not induce a durable representation, it certainly cannot provide a tokenized 
(episodic) representation. This leaves the possibility that our subconscious is, strictly speaking, 
episodically blind and even potentially that the very process of perceiving involves episodically 
tagging experiences. This is what we call the Tokenized Percept Hypothesis, from which we 
will seek in future experiments to find further evidence. 
In summary, we have shown an effect of explicit recognition of items in the absence of 
any benefit obtained from successive repetition. These results suggest that the process of 
episodic encoding in RSVP follows a bottleneck behaviour, where most items fail to be durably 
consolidated in memory or even to leave any memory trace that is able to support evidence 
accumulation. Combined with the results of the detection task, the findings suggest that in fast 
RSVP streams, items can be discriminated easily on the basis of their perceptual attributes in 
conditions where only a small subset of them can be durably encoded. Taken together, these 
results agree with 2-stage theories of temporal attention, where a first stage of large capacity 
consists of the activation of the perceptual properties of items (enabling, for example, effective 
detection performance) and a second stage encodes a subset of items into durable WM. Insofar 
as it is assumed that conscious percepts are those that can be reported/retrieved, these results 
suggest that conscious perception is required for an additional function: the accumulation of 
evidence through repetition.  











Assume a sequence of 𝑁 trials in which an item repeats, index these trials with the natural 
numbers [1: 𝑁] ⊆ ℕ. Define the predicate 𝑆𝑒𝑒_𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔(𝑗) to hold if and only if the 
repeating item is seen as repeating on the 𝑗th trial. Then, we define first seen as rep. 
probability as follows. Eq. (A.1): 
𝑝𝑖 = 𝑝( 𝑆𝑒𝑒_𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔(𝑖)  |  ∀𝑗 ∈ ℕ (1 ≤ 𝑗 < 𝑖)  ∙  ¬ 𝑆𝑒𝑒_𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔(𝑗) ) 
That is, 𝑝𝑖 is the conditional probability that the repeating item is seen as repeating on trial 𝑖, 
given that on all previous trials it has not been seen as repeating. 
The key property we are interested in is invariance to number of repetitions, which holds if 








We have also implemented a very simple probabilistic model of the two evidence 
accumulation cases to confirm our intuition re. the invariance of conditional probabilities. 
Our objective was not to provide a full mechanistic investigation of evidence accumulation in 
an RSVP context, but rather to simply confirm our intuition that the invariance to number of 
repetitions property that is central to our argument does follow from a “simple as possible” 
interpretation of a lack of evidence accumulation compared to accumulation. 
 
As we did for the mathematical definitions, assume a sequence of 𝑁 trials in which an item 
repeats, index these trials with the natural numbers [1: 𝑁] ⊆ ℕ. Our models are defined in 
terms of the updating of two predicates across these trials: 
 
1) 𝑆𝑒𝑒(𝑖) is 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒 if and only if the repeating item is seen on trial 𝑖. 
2) 𝑆𝑒𝑒_𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔(𝑖) is 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒 if and only if the repeating item is seen as repeating on trial 𝑖. 
 
Note that the target can be seen, without being seen as repeating, which requires it to have 
been seen multiple times. As a result, we distinguish between Seeing and Seeing as 
Repeating. 
The basic model is defined by the following rules, where we sample ones and zeros 
according to Bernoulli distributions, i.e. from 𝐵𝑒𝑟𝑛(𝑞), where 𝑞 is the probability of getting 
a one. Eq. (B.1): 
 
𝑆𝑒𝑒(1) = 𝑋~𝐵𝑒𝑟𝑛(𝑝𝑖) 
 
𝑆𝑒𝑒_𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔(1) = 0 
 
∀𝑖 ∈ ℕ (1 < 𝑖 ≤ 𝑁) ∙ 
𝑆𝑒𝑒(𝑖) = {
 𝑋~𝐵𝑒𝑟𝑛(𝑝𝑖)       , 𝑖𝑓 ∀𝑗 (1 ≤ 𝑗 < 𝑖)  ∙  ¬𝑆𝑒𝑒(𝑗) 
1                  ,                      𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
 
𝑆𝑒𝑒_𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔(𝑖) = {
 1         , 𝑖𝑓 𝑆𝑒𝑒(𝑖 − 1)  ∨ 𝑆𝑒𝑒_𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔(𝑖 − 1)





This basic model can be specialised into the two versions we are interested in by specifying 
how 𝑝𝑖 is calculated. 
 
No Evidence Accumulation is obtained by setting 𝑝𝑖 to a constant, say 𝑝 (0 ≤ 𝑝 ≤ 1). 
 
Evidence Accumulation is obtained by setting 𝑝𝑖 to a monotonically increasing function of 
𝑖, which does not go out of bounds. The easiest way to do this is to assume simple linear 
evidence accumulation, where we first define 𝑏 and 𝐶 such that, 0 < 𝑏 < 1, 0 ≤ 𝐶 < 1 and  
(𝑏. 𝑁) + 𝐶 ≤ 1, in order that accumulation stays within bounds. Then we define the 
following. Eq. (B.2): 
 
𝑝𝑖 = (𝑏. 𝑖) + 𝐶 
 
Note, 𝑏 is assumed to be sufficiently above zero to exclude seemingly no evidence 
accumulation patterns being generated. 
 
Other more complex monotonically increasing functions could be used. 
 
Figure B.1: Results of simulations: the fixed probability for the Without Evidence 
Accumulation case, 𝑝 in the model description above, was set to 0.25, while 𝑏 = 0.075 and 
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𝐶 = 0.075 in the With Evidence Accumulation case. The first-seeing as a rep. probability is 
shown on the y-axis. The With Accum case clearly shows an increasing first-seeing as a rep. 
probability across repetitions, while the Without Accum case shows no increase in the first-
seeing as a rep. probability from the second presentation onwards. Note, a repetition cannot 
be seen at first presentation, i.e. position one. 
 
Modelling Results 
Simulation results are presented in figure 4. The average across 8000 simulated 
blocks for each of Without and With Evidence Accumulation are presented. Each block 
reflects six presentations of the repeating item. For each repetition instance, we calculate the 
first-seeing as a rep. probability, across all the blocks. The fixed probability for the Without 
Evidence Accumulation case, 𝑝 in the model description above, was set to 0.25 in the 


























Contrary to the case of short SOAs, performance at long SOAs (>200ms) increased 
between the first and second repetition (this pattern is observed in 5 out of 6 long SOA 
conditions). However, in this analysis, high performance at any repetition entails a loss of 
power. The underlined probabilities in the table are those where the available data was less 
than 40% of the data available at the first repetition.  When so little data is available, the 
conditional probability can be considered unreliable.  That is, at long SOAs, by the third 
repetition most participants had identified all the RIs. This emphasizes the fact that when the 
presentation is clearly above threshold the task is trivially easy. In contrast, at short SOAs 
participants found it very difficult to identify the RIs, which reinforces the view that it is very 
Table Table C.1 Mean probability of first identification as a rep. and (standard deviations). Experiment 1 
 Repetition 
SOA 1 2 3 4 5 
33 0.02 (0.07) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 0) 0 (0) 
133 0.13 (0.2) 0.22 (0.29) 0.23 (0.35) 0.16 (0.3) 0.18 (0.36) 
233 0.29 (0.22) 0.4 (0.34) 0.42 (0.47) 0.42(0.48) 0.19 (0.38) 
333 0.33 (0.28) 0.44 (0.39) 0.55 (0.46) 0.67 (0.44) 0.25 (0.50) 
433 0.44 (0.33) 0.46 (0.44) 0.27 (0.39) 0.36 (0.46) 0.25 (0.47) 
533 0.44 (0.29) 0.69 (0.39) 0.44 (0.47) 0.33 (0.53) 0.12 (0.25) 
 
Table Table C.2 Mean probability of first identification as a rep. and (standard deviations). Experiment 2 
 Repetition 
SOA 1 2 3 4 5 
17 0.01 (0.07) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0.01 (0.07) 
50 0.07 (0.14) 0.07 (0.17) 0.03 (0.1) 0.03 (0.12) 0.04 (0.11) 
84 0.08 (0.15) 0.1 (0.17) 0.1 (0.24) 0.09 (0.18) 0.06 (0.16) 
117 0.21 (0.22) 0.16 (0.27) 0.27 (0.38) 0.19 (0.38) 0.14 (0.29) 
250 0.58 (0.30) 0.35(0.40) 0.43 (0.47) 0.30 (0.49) 0.43 (0.54) 
400 0.57 (0.25) 0.60 (0.47) 0.35 (0.48) 0.57 (0.54) 0.33 (0.59) 
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difficult to search for items on the basis of episodic information (repetitions) when items are 





Experimental stimuli (targets) used in Experiments 1 and 2. 
Words WF AoA Concreteness Familiarity 
List1     
rubber 15 289 596 547 
cherry 6 317 611 514 
butter 27 206 618 615 
muscle 42 397 573 540 
cellar 26 361 572 467 
cotton 38 306 608 521 
avenue 46 372 539 529 
fiddle 2 367 582 465 
lawyer 43 481 569 520 
stable 30 292 562 519 
palace 38 294 579 462 
timber 19 403 578 440 
school 492 228 573 582 
racket 5 386 562 486 
kettle 3 274 602 551 
rabbit 11 206 635 523 
kennel 3 322 611 449 
hammer 9 278 605 515 
Mean 47.5 321.06 587.5 513.61 
     
List1     
pigeon 3 325 609 499 
square 143 250 516 576 
pocket 46 228 578 590 
cavern 1 433 534 400 
copper 13 428 547 491 
bridge 98 289 623 561 
thread 15 267 607 522 
orange 23 203 601 567 
rattle 5 261 549 448 
driver 49 283 553 593 
mother 216 144 579 632 
banker 5 392 547 524 
beggar 2 364 533 435 
barrel 24 319 590 487 
weapon 42 375 560 517 
button 10 192 613 573 
singer 10 314 553 548 
branch 33 303 583 529 
Mean 41 298.33 570.83 527.33 
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